The term ‘Internal Security Act’ is often given to a piece of legislation laying down regulations that enable the executive government of a jurisdiction to preserve the internal security of the nation. In some jurisdictions, it authorises the government to arrest and detain individuals without trial. The Malaysian Internal Security Act (ISA) 1960 was originally enacted by the Malaysian government in 1960 under Article 149 of the Malaysian Constitution. However, there were numerous concerns raised as to the implications of this Act at various levels over the years and this led to it being repealed. On 15 September 2011, ISA 1960 was repealed and replaced by the Security Offences (Special Measures) (SOSMA) Act 2012. SOSMA 2012 was enacted in answer to the criticism of the ISA 1960 and it does show some positive changes. However, the debate as to the concerns with regards to ISA has not been laid to rest. It is advocated and generally accepted by most people around the world that the n.
See Full PDF See Full PDFWhen the Malaysian Prime Minister announced in September 2011 that the time had come to end the state of emergency, abolish detention without trial by repealing the feared Internal Security Act, and remove or reform other repressive laws, it seemed that the government might be genuinely committed to progressive, if limited, law reform. However, as this essay demonstrates, the legislative changes fell well short of the reforms that had long been demanded by the Malaysian Bar and civil and political rights campaigners who have rightly been deeply concerned about the health of Malaysian democracy and the erosion of constitutional governance and the rule of law. The essay identifies two impediments to the Prime Minister’s purported goal of transforming Malaysia into an inclusive democracy that respects fundamental human rights and the rule of law: the entrenching of ‘emergency legality’ within the constitution, and long-standing government tolerance and encouragement of ethno-nationalist politicians who pervert law and the institutions of the state for their own ends by invoking an emergency mentality.
Download Free PDF View PDF
Download Free PDF View PDF
Download Free PDF View PDF
Singapore: Negotiating State and Society, 1965–2015
The Singapore Constitution, together with the nation, turns 50 in 2015. This chapter focuses on the Constitution's intended role as a constraint on the exercise of power of the political branches of the government – the executive and the legislature. The judiciary has the responsibility to ensure that the political branches act in accordance with the Constitution, including the fundamental liberties guaranteed to individuals therein. Yet only a handful of applications for judicial review have had some measure of success. In other cases, the courts have shown great restraint in striking down governmental action and legislation as unconstitutional. I explore why there seems to be such reluctance by the judiciary to play a fuller part in assessing whether the political branches have traversed the limits set by the Constitution. The courts appear to have a very modest conception of their role, rather than vindicating individual rights, they seem to find it more appropriate to defer to the prior policy choices of the political branches. This chapter is available from the Routledge website at https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315658599-8/constraint-restraint-singapore-constitution-50-jack-tsen-ta-lee.
Download Free PDF View PDF
